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I. PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellant: Glade Leon Parduhn 
(Partner of Brad Buchi, deceased) 
(Hereinafter "Parduhn") 
Proposed Intervenor/Appellant: 
3. Defendants/Counter-claimants/Appellees: 
University Texaco Partnership 
(Hereinafter "University Texaco") 
Natalie Buchi, Allison Buchi, Annabelle 
Buchi, Lance Buchi and Jessica Buchi 
(Children of Brad Buchi, deceased) 
(Hereinafter "Buchi Children") 
Defendant/Counter-claimant/Appellee Jo Anne Buchi 
(Widow of Brad Buchi, deceased) 
(Hereinafter "JoAnne Buchi") 
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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j). 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
a. JoAnne Buchi's Statement of Issues and Standard of Review 
1. Was the trial court's decision regarding the equitable distribution of the insurance 
proceeds on the life of Brad Buchi to JoAnne Buchi and the Buchi children and the remaining 
assets of University Texaco to Parduhn clearly erroneous? 
In the September 6, 2002 decision, the Utah Supreme Court remanded this case to the 
trial court for one purpose, "for the trial court to equitably distribute the insurance proceeds 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104(5)." (Parduhn v. Buchi, et al , 61 P.3d 982 (Utah 
2002). 
This issue is a question of fact and equity. The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated the 
standard of review in cases of equity as, "On appeal in actions of equity, a reviewing court may 
set aside findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous." Englert v. Zane, 848 P.2d 165 (Utah 
App. 1993); Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991); Grayson Roper Ltd, v. Finlinson, 782 
P.2d 467 (Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 1989). "A finding 
is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of evidence or if the court is otherwise 
definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 
1174 (Utah 1989). Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 (a) reads in pertinent part, "Findings 
of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses." 
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2. Was the trial court's denial of University Texaco's Motion to Intervene a clear 
abuse of discretion? 
This issue on appeal is a mixed question of law and fact. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 24 (b) regarding permissive intervention reads in pertinent part, "Upon timely application 
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and 
the main action have a question of law or fact in common . . . In exercising its discretion the 
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of 
the rights of the original parties." The Utah Supreme Court has enunciated the standard of 
review in permissive intervention cases as, UA trial court's grant of intervention pursuant to Rule 
24 (b) involves the discretion of the trial court, and we will not overturn its ruling absent a clear 
abuse of discretion." State v. SUCEC, 924 P.2d 882 (Utah 1996); Republic Ins. Group v. 
Doman, 774 P.2d 1130 (Utah 1989). 
3. Was the trial court's decision that the life insurance policy on Brad Buchi was not 
partnership property of University Texaco clearly erroneous? 
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-5 states in part, "Unless the contrary intention appears, property 
acquired with partnership funds is partnership property." This issue on appeal is a question of 
fact. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 (a) provides that the findings of fact of the trial 
court, sitting without a jury, "shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
b. Issues That Should Not Be Considered In This Appeal 
In his Statement of the Issues, Parduhn identified issues dealing with application of Utah 
Code Ann. §31A-21-104 to this case. (Parduhn brief, pg. 1-5). The Utah Supreme Court ruled 
that this code provision applied to this case in its September 6, 2002 decision. (Parduhn v. 
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Bennett, et al, 61 P.3d 982 (Utah 2002)). It is JoAnne Buchi's position these issues have been 
resolved by the Utah Supreme Court in the first appeal of this case and are no longer appropriate 
for consideration by the court. 
VI. STATUTES AND RULES 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 6,7,9, 10,24,38,39,40,42,43 
Utah Code Ann. §75-6-201 (1) 25 
Utah Code Ann. §75-2-502 26 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-313 29 
Utah Code Ann. §48-1-5 7, 34 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-105 38 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-1-301 40 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24 7, 30 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 6, 7, 21 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17 31 
VII. STATEMENT OF CASE 
Glade Parduhn and Brad Buchi entered into a Partnership Agreement with a buy/sell 
provision to operate University Texaco in 1979. The partnership purchased life insurance on 
each of the partners, increasing it several times over the years. In 1989, the amount of insurance 
was increased to $300,000.00 on Brad's life and $250,000.00 on Parduhn's life. The buy/sell 
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provision stated that all of the proceeds of the life insurance should go to the "wife and 
survivors" of the deceased partner and the business should go to the surviving partner. The 
partnership sold the two service stations it then owned on July 14, 1997. Brad Buchi died on or 
about August 7, 1997. Glade Parduhn claimed he was, personally, entitled to the proceeds of the 
life insurance policy since he was the named beneficiary. Jo Anne Buchi, Brad's widow, and his 
five children claimed they were entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance proceeds pursuant to 
the partnership agreement (Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 11) and Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104. 
(Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 9) 
This matter was originally tried before Judge Bruce Lubeck, without a jury, in August, 
2001. Judge Lubeck presided over a two day trial where numerous witnesses, including Glade 
Parduhn, testified and significant evidence was admitted. In his August 27, 2001 Memorandum 
Decision, Judge Lubeck found in favor of JoAnne Buchi and the Buchi children stating he 
believed the buy/sell agreement was still in full force as of the date of Brad Buchi's death. He 
also found JoAnne Buchi and the Buchi children had properly pled and had reasonably relied on 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 even though he did not base his ruling on that statute. Judge 
Lubeck stated that even if he had based his decision on §31A-21-104, he would have found in 
favor of JoAnne Buchi and the Buchi children on the basis of equity. He found Parduhn was 
adequately put on notice and not disadvantaged by JoAnne Buchi and the Buchi children's 
reliance on §31A-21-104. (Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 4). 
Parduhn appealed the decision of Judge Lubeck to the Utah Supreme Court, asserting as 
one basis, that JoAnne Buchi and the Buchi children had not timely claimed their entitlement 
based on Section 31A-21-104. The Utah Supreme Court, in a decision issued on September 6, 
2002, reversed Judge Lubeck's decision, in part, stating the partnership was dissolved as of the 
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date of the sale of the service stations on July 14, 1997 and, therefore the partnership agreement 
was null and void as of the death of Brad Buchi. (Parduhn v. Bennett, et al, 61 P.3d 982 (Utah 
2002), (Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 6). Contrary to what Parduhn is now asserting, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 applied to the case at hand. The court 
not only decided it was appropriate to apply it to this case but, it was controlling. Importantly, 
the court specifically found that Glade Parduhn did not have an "insurable interest" in the life of 
Brad Buchi as of the date of his death. Therefore, Parduhn could not receive the insurance 
proceeds on the life of Brad Buchi even though he was the named insured. The Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
uThus, at the time of Buchi's death, Parduhn lacked an insurable interest under §31A-
21-104 (1) (b), and may 'not knowingly procure . . . an interest in the proceeds of [the] insurance 
policy.' However, [a]n insurance policy is not invalid because the policy holder lacks insurable 
interest. . . but a court with appropriate jurisdiction may order the proceeds to be paid to some 
person who is equitably entitled to them, other than the one to whom the policy is designated 
to be payable, or it may create a constructive trust in the proceeds or a part of them on behalf of 
such a person, subject to all the valid terms and conditions of the policy other than those relating 
to insurable interest or consent." (footnotes and citations omitted, emphasis added) 
The Utah Supreme Court remanded this matter back to the trial court for one purpose and 
one purpose only, to distribute the proceeds of the life insurance policy on Brad Buchi's life to 
those who are equitably entitled to them. The court stated: 
"Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to equitably distribute the insurance 
proceeds pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 (5)." The Utah Supreme Court did not 
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order a new trial or require the trial court to take additional evidence but, to "equitably distribute 
the insurance proceeds." 
Pursuant to the instructions of the Utah Supreme Court, Judge Lubeck issued a Ruling 
and Order on May 14, 2003 wherein he decided based on the evidence and testimony admitted at 
the August 2001 trial, Jo Anne Buchi and the Buchi children were equitably entitled to the 
proceeds of the life insurance on her husband and their father's life. The trial court further found 
that Parduhn was entitled to the total amount of the remaining assets of the partnership. Judge 
Lubeck fully described the factual basis for his decision having had the opportunity to hear, see 
and review the testimony of all the witnesses, including Glade Parduhn, as well as all of the 
documentary evidence presented at trial. (Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 7). 
In addition, Judge Lubeck ruled against Glade Parduhn, as the surviving partner charged 
with the winding up of the partnership affairs, when he tried to intervene on behalf of University 
Texaco Partnership in April of 2003. The court decided Parduhn's attempt to intervene was not 
timely and he had waived the partnership's opportunity to intervene in this lawsuit at this very 
late date. The court stated Parduhn was fully aware of the proceedings and the controversy and 
could not claim he was unaware of any claim the partnership may have until after the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision. Of note, Judge Lubeck stated that when considering an equitable 
distribution of the life insurance proceeds, he could make an award to the partnership if he 
determined it was equitably entitled. However, the court decided, based on the evidence, the 
partnership had no equitable entitlement to any of the proceeds inasmuch as the partnership was 
dissolved as of the date of the sale. 
Parduhn's appeal, both personally and as the sole surviving partner of University Texaco, 
is without merit and should be denied. Judge Lubeck, following the orders of the Utah Supreme 
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Court, equitably distributed the life insurance proceeds to JoAnne Buchi and the Buchi children 
based on substantial, credible evidence adduced at trial in this matter. Judge Lubeck further 
ordered that Parduhn was entitled to all the remaining assets of University of Texaco. JoAnne 
Buchi requests the Utah Supreme Court to uphold the solidly based decision of the trial court and 
reject Parduhn's personal appeal and appeal on behalf of University Texaco. 
VIII. MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On May 23, 1979, Brad Buchi and Glade Parduhn agreed to form an equal 
partnership under the name of University Texaco Company and to conduct a service station 
business. The partners added a buy-sell agreement to the partnership agreement, which provided 
that "in the event of death of either" partner, the survivor would purchase the decedent's interest 
in the "business" and "do with the business as he sees fit." They also agreed that the buy-out 
would be funded by the proceeds of life insurance policies on each other's lives, the premiums of 
which would be paid by the partnership. (Parduhn v. Bennett, et al 61 P.3d. 982 (Utah 2002). 
2. On January 25, 1984, Buchi and Parduhn amended their partnership agreement to 
increase the amount of the insurance coverage from $20,000 to $100,000, and purchased life 
insurance coverage for that amount. On January 4, 1989, without amending the partnership 
agreement, Buchi and Parduhn again increased the insurance coverage on each other's lives to 
$300,000 and $250,000 respectively. The $300,000 policy on Buchi's life named Parduhn as the 
beneficiary and "buy/sell partner" as the purpose for the policy. (Parduhn v. Bennett, et al 61 
P.3d. 982 (Utah 2002). 
3. Buchi and Parduhn operated their business for eighteen years. Early in 1997, they 
contracted to sell their business and service stations to Blackett Oil Company. They closed their 
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deal on July 14, 1997, transferred the business assets to Blackett, and ceased to do business. 
Buchi died on August 7, 1997. (Parduhn v. Bennett, et al 61 P.3d. 982 (Utah 2002). 
4. Buchi and Parduhn had a fairly loose business arrangement. Buchi was the 
"money man" and ran the University Texaco station. Parduhn was the "P.R. man" and ran the 
Olympus Cove Chevron. Each station had it's own checking account. (Trial Transcript, pgs. 
0023, 0055). 
5. At the time of his death, Brad Buchi was married to Jo Anne Buchi. They were 
married on May 18, 1992. They had been separated but were trying to get a working 
arrangement to get back together when Brad died. (Trial Transcript, pg. 0150). 
6. Brad Buchi was the father of five children; Natalie, Allison, Annabelle, Lance and 
Jessica. Annabelle, Lance and Jessica were minors as of the date of their father's death. Allison 
and Natalie were slightly older. The children were still dependent on their father for support. 
(Trial Transcript, pgs. 0107-0108). 
7. It was Parduhn's understanding of the partnership agreement with the buy/sell 
provision that if either of the two partners died, the surviving partner was suppose to give the 
deceased partner's family all the money from the life insurance policy to cash out their interest in 
the business. The surviving partner could then do with the business as he saw fit. (Trial 
Transcript, pgs. 0040-0041; pg. 0043). 
8. When the insurance was increased to $300,000 on the life of Brad Buchi and to 
$250,000 on the life of Glade Parduhn in 1989, it was done at the urging of Brad Buchi's then 
wife and mother of his five children, Lissa Buchi. they decided to increase the insurance since 
the business was doing well and had increased in value. Lissa, Brad and Glade Parduhn met in 
the office at the Texaco Station to discuss the need to increase the insurance. Glade agreed to the 
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increase. Lissa called Sheldon Hansen, their insurance agent, on the phone from the office. He 
told them that for roughly the same premium, they could get the $300,000 on Brad's life and the 
$250,000 on Glade's life. The value of Glade's policy was less because he was a smoker and 
was older than Brad. (Trial Transcript, pgs. 0100-0104). Parduhn acknowledges the meeting 
between him, Brad and Lissa could have taken place. (Trial Transcript, pg. 0153). 
10. Parduhn and Buchi never had a written agreement stating that if one of them died, 
the deceased partner's family would get part of the proceeds and the surviving partner would get 
part of the proceeds on the life insurance policy. (Trial Transcript, pg. 0043). 
11. Lissa Buchi testified, Parduhn never said the proceeds should be split between the 
deceased partner's family and the surviving partner. 
MR. DUNN: Okay. I can tie that in closing if necessary, Your Honor. Let me ask you 
one other area of questions, if I may: In this conversation that you had in the Texaco 
station with yourself present and Brad present and Glade present, I'd like for you to 
focus, if you would, on the participation in that conversation that Glade Parduhn had, the 
things that he said, the involvement in the conversation that he participated in. And I 
would like to ask you your best recollection as to what Mr. Parduhn said about the 
question of whether or not the increased amount to $300,000 was for the purpose of 
going to the buy/sell agreement or if any part of it was for the purpose of going to him 
personally, Mr. Parduhn, personally? 
A. That was never an issue-
Q. Did he ever— 
A. -of it going to him, personally 
Q. Did he ever mention anything of that kind? 
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A. Nothing of that kind. 
Q. What did he say with reference to increasing the buy/sell agreement amount to 
$300,000 
A. Just that he agreed that we should up the buy/sell policy (Inaudible). 
Q. Thank you very—go ahead, I didn't mean to cut you off. 
A. Oh, just that he agreed to it, and he also—that he agreed that his would only 250 
because of his smoking and age. 
MR. DUNN: Thank you very much, ma'am. (Trail Transcript, pgs. 0108-0109) 
12. Parduhn read and signed the application and the insurance policy for $300,000 on 
the life of Brad Buchi. He understood the insurance policy was for the purpose of funding the 
buy/sell agreement. (Trial Transcript, pg. 0044). 
13. Sheldon Hansen told Parduhn the insurance policy had to be in connection with a 
buy/sell agreement in order to demonstrate an insurable interest. Mr. Hansen testified, 
Q. In Mr. Parduhn's testimony and more particularly in his deposition but also in 
trial, he testified that: "I think Sheldon put that in there, the buy/sell reference in 
the application, so that we could get a policy on each other." 
A. I am not sure what the inference, "Sheldon put it in there." I wrote it. I - but I 
write - everything in an application I write, I write at the instruction of my client. 
Q. Okay. And it was written in there: "For the purpose of demonstrating the 
existence of an insurable interest;" correct? 
A. That's correct. 
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Q. And you determined that the insurable interest that needed to be noted in order for 
the policy to be appropriately written was that there was a buy/sell agreement in 
place? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And you had a conversation with Mr. Parduhn to the effect that this particular 
policy was being purchased with reference to that buy/sell agreement or a buy/sell 
agreement? 
A. I would presume that's correct. That's a long time ago, and I don't remember 
every word in those conversations. But that is consistent with my understanding 
of the intent of these policies, and it's consistent with what I have recorded on the 
applications. 
Q. Is that also consistent with your understanding as to the requirements of insurable 
interest? 
A. Yes. 
MR. DUNN: Thank you very much, sir. (Trial Transcript, pgs. 0132-0133). 
14. It was Sheldon Hansen's policy and practice to define as clearly as possible in the 
application for buy/sell life insurance and in the policy itself if the proceeds were to be split or 
paid out according to some different formula. (Trial Transcript, pgs. 0142, 0146). 
15. Parduhn never told Sheldon Hansen he wanted the proceeds of the $300,000 
policy to be split between himself and the Buchi family. Mr. Hansen testified, 
BY MR. DUNN: 
Q. To follow up a little bit further on the fact that the policy does not include any kind 
of provision that part of it goes to buy/sell, part of it goes to Glade. Did Glade 
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Parduhn ever tell you, with reference to the $300,000 policy, that he wanted 
$100,000 of it or $200,000 of it to go to apply to the buy/sell agreement and that 
some other amount was to go to him personally? Did he ever tell you that? 
A. I have no recollection of that. 
16. In 1989, when the buy/sell insurance policies on Brad's life for $300,000.00 and 
on Glade's life for $250,000.00 were obtained, Glade had a total of $600,000.00 of insurance in 
force or pending on his life. (Trial Transcript, pg. 0148). 
17. It was common in Sheldon Hansen's vast experience as an insurance agent for 
small businesses for individuals to have life insurance in addition to buy/sell life insurance. 
(Trial Transcript, pgs. 0148-0149). 
18. In 1989, when the buy/sell insurance policies were increased to $300,000.00 on 
Brad's life and $250,000.00 on Glade's life. Brad and his then wife, Lissa and Glade and his 
wife Nedra exchanged and personally took over the previous two $100,000.00 buy/sell life 
insurance policies they purchased in 1984. (Trial Transcript, pg. 0026). 
19. The partnership ceased doing any business whatsoever after the services stations 
were sold to Blackett Oil on July 14, 1997. (Trial Transcript pg. 0034). 
20. After all the partnership debts, except a lawsuit involving Snap-On-Tools, were 
paid, there was approximately $100,000.00 in the escrow account being held at Associated Title 
Company. (Trial Transcript, pgs. 0035, 0038, 0056, 0063 Trial Exhibit 11 - Settlement 
Statement). 
21. The Snap-On-Tool debt was $6,250.66. (University Texaco's Appendix Ex. 6). 
22. After Brad's death, Parduhn, as the surviving partner took total control of winding 
up the partnership affairs. He did not seek approval or consult with Jo Anne Buchi and Buchi 
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children. He took control of the escrow account and any expenditures from it. (Trial Transcript, 
pgs. 0035, 0038, 0057,0064, 0065). 
IX. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court's decision regarding the equitable distribution of the insurance 
proceeds on the life of Brad Buchi to Jo Anne Buchi and the Buchi children and the remaining 
assets of University Texaco to Parduhn was not "clearly erroneous." The great weight of the 
evidence fully supports Judge Lubeck's conclusions. The decision was fair and equitable and 
should be upheld. 
2. The trial court's denial of University Texaco's Motion to Intervene was 
appropriate. The motion was not brought timely and would cause undue and unnecessary delay 
and prejudice to the Buchi family. Glade Parduhn, as the surviving partner, had exclusive 
responsibilities and fiduciary duty to bring any claims on behalf of University Texaco. His 
attorney representing him in his personal claim for buy/sell insurance on Brad's life, also 
represented Parduhn and University Texaco in winding up the partnership affairs so Parduhn 
should have known of any potential claims of University Texaco. Parduhn cannot claim surprise 
and should not at this late date be allowed to intervene. Judge Lubeck's denial should be upheld. 
3. They buy/sell insurance on Brad Buchi's life was not a partnership asset. Though 
the premiums were paid by the partnership, all the other credible evidence leads to the 
conclusion the partners never intended the buy/sell insurance policies each on their lives to be 
partnership assets. Rather, the buy/sell insurance policies were the partners' way to protect their 
families. Judge Lubeck's decision in this regard should be upheld. 
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X. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION 
WAS FAIR AND JUST 
1. Joanne Buchi And The Buchi Children Are Equitably Entitled To The Life 
Insurance Proceeds On Brad Buchi 
In the Memorandum Decision of May 14, 2003, the trial court stated in pertinent part: 
"Although the buy-sell agreement was no longer effective, as decided by the Supreme 
Court, it does provide guidance in deciding Buchi and Parduhn's intent when they obtained their 
policies. It is clear that Buchi and Parduhn obtained the policies with the intent to provide their 
respective heirs with immediate funds and to cash out the deceased partner's interest in the 
partnership allowing the surviving partner's interest in the partnership allowing the surviving 
partner to do as he saw fit with the partnership business. No additional insurance was provided 
or purchased for the surviving partners use in preserving the business. This indicates to the court 
that Buchi and Parduhn intended that their respective heirs be the sole beneficiaries of the 
policies. Furthermore, no discretion was given to the surviving partner to determine whether the 
policy amount was insufficient or in excess of the value of the deceased partner's interest in the 
partnership. If they intended the surviving partner to retain any portion of the proceeds, the court 
believes that such a provision could have and would have been provided to show such intent." 
(Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 7, pg. 9, Record 1902). 
"Moreover, in an accounting between the partners, the respective policies would have 
been divided fairly and equitably to both parties. When the partnership was dissolved, as already 
decided by the Supreme Court, neither party had an insurable interest in the life of the other and 
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it would hardly seem equitable to force the partners, in practical effect, to continue the 
partnership with respect to the life insurance. Parduhn would receive the benefit of Buchi's 
policy and Buchi's heirs would be in wait for their benefit from Parduhn's policy. Parduhn's 
policy would lose any value beyond its surrender value if the premiums were not kept up, and 
Buchi's heirs' rights might be defeated by the failure of Parduhn to continue to pay his share of 
the premiums since the partnership was dissolved. This result would be inequitable. Upon 
determination of partnership assets it is reasonable to believe that each partner would have 
received his policy and could choose to continue or discontinue the coverage without claim from 
the past partner. See, e.g., Miller v. Hall, 150 P.2d 287, 290 (Cal App. 1944)' see also, Elliott v. 
Metropolitain Life Insurance Co., 116 Ind. App. 404 (Ind. App. 1946). The court does not 
believe, as matter of equity that Parduhn should benefit from the death of Buchi after the 
partnership was dissolved. (Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 7, pg. 10, Record 1903). 
The court finds that an equitable distribution of the insurance proceeds is to the surviving 
wife and children of Buchi. (Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 7, pg. 11, Record 1904). 
In the case ofMacKay v. Hardy, 896 P. 2d. 626, (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court 
enunciated the well known standard of appellate review in cases of trial court decisions based 
equity. The court held, "Although this court may fashion its own remedy as a substitute for the 
judgment of the trial court in equity cases, we will disturb the trial court's judgment only where 
necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Penrose v. Penrose, 656 P. 2d. 1017, 1019 (Utah 
1982); Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P. 2d. 338, 340 (Utah 1980). Moreover, we will not reverse the 
findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless they are against the clear weight of 
the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. In re Estate of Bartell 776 P. 2d. 885, 886 
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(Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d. 191, 193 (Utah 1994). We review the factual 
findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence 
using a clearly erroneous standard. Quoting State v. Brown, 853 P. 2d. 851, 855 (Utah 1992)." 
(at page 629, emphasis added.) 
In an earlier decision that stands for the same proposition, the Utah Court of Appeals 
held, "In equity cases, appeal may be had on the facts as well as the law. Parks Enters., Inc. v. 
New Century Realty, Inc., 652 P. 2d. 918, 920 (Utah 1982) (quoting McBride v. McBride, 581 P. 
2d. 996, 997 (Utah 1978). On appeal in actions of equity, a reviewing court may set aside 
findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous. Grayson Roper Ltd. V. Finlinson, 782 P. 
2.d. 467, 470 (Utah 1989); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha his. Co., 776 P. 2d. 896, 899 (Utah 1989); 
See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 52 (a). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the 
great weight of evidence or if the court is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a 
mistake has been made. Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P. 2d. 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989). The reviewing 
court gives due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. 776 P 2d. at 899 (quoting Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 52 (a); Grayson Roper Ltd. V. Finlinson, 782 P. 2d. at 470." (at page 168, 
emphasis added.) 
The trial court's determination that the Buchi family is equitably entitled to the proceeds 
is well founded and is absolutely consistent with Brad Buchi's intent when he entered the 
buy/sell agreement and purchased the various insurance policies on his life throughout the years. 
There is not one shred of evidence that Brad would want Glade Parduhn, his former partner or 
University Texaco, the dissolved and defunct business, to get a huge windfall to the disadvantage 
of his wife and children. It simply doesn't make sense and it defies logic. Certainly, any 
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equitable analysis of this situation requires consideration of Brad Buchi's blatant intent and 
desire. 
In addition, Parduhn's alternative claim that he only agreed to give Buchi's family 
$100,000.00 makes no sense. It is in direct opposition to the testimony of Lissa Buchi and 
Sheldon Hansen. The application and the policy itself describe no such split. Parduhn admits 
there is no writing that states there should be a split between him and the Buchi family of the 
$3000,000.00 life insurance proceeds. 
Parduhn claims Brad provided other life insurance for his family so he must have 
intended for the $300,000.00 to go to Parduhn. That, too, makes no sense. Parduhn also had a 
significant amount of insurance on his life for the benefit of his family ($600,000.00). Sheldon 
Hansen testified his clients often had life insurance in addition to buy/sell insurance to protect 
their families. The fact both Brad and Glade had additional life insurance for their families has 
no bearing on their intention regarding the buy/sell insurance. 
It is reasonable to conclude, the partners would have exchanged the policies and taken 
them over personally as they had in the past had Brad not died. All credible evidence indicates 
both Brad's and Parduhn's intent. Judge Lubeck's decision is in no way "clearly erroneous" and 
substantiated by the "great weight of the evidence." 
a. JoAnne Buchi was Brad Buchi's Wife at the time of his death. 
Parduhn and University Texaco, claim that JoAnne is not entitled to any of the proceeds 
because she and Brad were separated at the time of his death and "her requested divorce was all 
but, final when he died." This statement is not supported by the facts. JoAnne testified at the 
time of trial, she and Brad were married on May 18, 1992 and remained married until the date of 
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his death. She further testified that at the time of his death they were trying to get a working 
arrangement so they could get back together. (Trial Transcript, pg. 151). 
The divorce complaint was filed on April 2, 1996. On August 13, 1996, JoAnne and 
Brad entered an stipulation regarding the payment of certain debts during their separation. In the 
stipulation, JoAnne and Brad said the stipulation was to give them an opportunity to reconcile. 
The stipulation stated it was not the intention of the parties to pursue a final divorce decree at 
that point. (JoAnne Buchi's Addendum Ex.10). JoAnne and Brad put the divorce on hold. On 
June 9, 1997, the court issued an order to show cause for lack of prosecution. (JoAnne Buchi's 
Addendum Ex.11). There is no evidence to contradict JoAnne's testimony that she and Brad 
were working through the issues of their marriage and had every intention to remain married. 
Judge Stirba ruled on May 24, 2000 that JoAnne Buchi was Brad Buchi's wife as of the 
date of his death and was entitled to share with the Buchi children in any award by this court. 
(JoAnne Buchi's Addendum Ex. 1). Judge Lubeck took judicial notice of Judge Stirba's ruling 
and adopted it at the time of trial in this case. At the trial the following exchange took place. 
MR. DUNN: Your honor, I'd like to move at this point for the Court to take judicial 
notice of Judge Stirba's prior ruling in this case. 
THE COURT: Yes, she ruled while there was something pending there had not been a 
decree and so JoAnne Buchi was still the wife of Brad Buchi. 
MR. TANNER: That's correct, Your Honor. 
MR. DUNN: And therefore entitled to any distribution that goes to wife and survivors. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. DUNN: Thank you very much, sir. 
(Trial Transcript, pg. 151). 
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Parduhn did not object to Judge Stirba's ruling or to Judge Lubeck's decision regarding 
Jo Anne Buchi's status as Brad Buchi's wife and her entitlement to share in any award to the 
Buchi family. He did not appeal the trial court's ruling in this regard in his first appeal. He 
cannot and should not be allowed to raise it now. Any dispute regarding JoAnne's entitlement to 
share in the award to her and the Buchi children should be deemed waived. 
Parduhn and University Texaco further try to dispute JoAnne's status as Brad's wife on 
the premise she was not Brad's "wife" at the time the partnership agreement was entered or when 
the insurance policies were first obtained. This position is also without merit. The partnership 
agreement referred to "wife and survivors." It did not specify any name for "wife," but merely 
the category. Judge Stirba and Judge Lubeck decided that meant wife as of the time of Brad 
Buchi's death. 
Parduhn and University Texaco state JoAnne Buchi lacked insurable interest in the life of 
Brad Buchi when the life insurance policies were purchased as a last ditch attempt to say JoAnne 
is not equitably entitled to any of the proceeds of the life insurance policy on her husband, Brad 
Buchi. This position is in direct opposition to the language of the applicable statutes. Utah Code 
Ann. §31A-21-104 states, "(l)(a) A person may not knowingly procure, direct, by assignment, or 
otherwise, an interest in the proceeds of an insurance policy unless he has or expects to have an 
insurable interest in the subject of the insurance. The concept of "insurable interest" in §31A-
21-104 is clear and concise, "'Insurable interest' in a person means, for persons closely related 
by blood or by law, a substantial interest engendered by love and affection, or in the case of 
other persons, a lawful and substantial interest in having the life, health, and bodily safety of the 
person insured continue." The trial court ruled JoAnne Buchi had an insurable interest in the life 
of Brad Buchi at the time of his death. She was his wife. There can be no doubt she did have an 
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insurable interest as defined by the relevant statutes. She is entitled to share in the proceeds of 
the life insurance policy on an equitable basis. 
Obviously, if any party to this litigation had reason to dispute JoAnne's equitable claim 
to the proceeds of the life insurance on Brad's life, it would be Brad Buchi's children by his 
previous marriage to Lissa Buchi. The Buchi children have never voiced any objection to 
JoAnne's participation in this litigation. Why? Because they know of the love and affection 
between their father and stepmother. They know of JoAnne's love and affection for them, 
throughout Brad and JoAnne's marriage and since Brad's death. They have stood together 
throughout this trial and appeal. Parduhn's allegations against at the Buchi family lack any 
credibility and should not be considered by this court. 
b. The insurance proceeds on the life of Brad Buchi should pass to his family as 
a non-testamentary transfer. 
In the same vein, Parduhn and University Texaco assert that whatever is awarded to 
JoAnne and the Buchi children should pass through the estate of Brad Buchi. This issue was also 
previously decided by Judge Stirba and adopted by Judge Lubeck. In her May 24, 2000 
decision, Judge Stirba ruled that whatever the family receives is through the insurance policy 
which is a non-testamentary transfer. (JoAnne Buchi's Addendum Ex. ). This decision was 
based on Utah Code Ann. §75-6-201 (1), which reads; "Any of the following provisions in an 
insurance policy, . . . conveyance, or any other written instrument effective as a contract, gift, 
conveyance, or trust are considered non-testamentary, and this code does not invalidate the 
instrument or any provision: (a) that money or other benefits previously due to, controlled, or 
owned by a decedent shall be paid after his death to a person designated by the decedent in either 
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the instrument or a separate writing . . . executed at the same time as the instrument or 
subsequently." 
The official comments to this section provide, "Because the types of provisions described 
in the statute are characterized as non-testamentary, the instrument does not have to be executed 
in compliance with §75-2-502; nor does it have to be probated, nor does the personal 
representative have any power or duty with respect to the assets involved." 
The proceeds at stake are from the life insurance policy on Brad's life and can be 
distributed on a non-testamentary basis pursuant to Utah law. Parduhn urges that any award to 
the Buchi family be ordered to pass through Brad's estate so he can pursue his and the 
partnership claims in the probate court. Those claims are not for specific amounts and the family 
disputes the validity of those claims. If Parduhn can't get the proceeds in this court, he plans on 
trying to get them in the probate court. The family will be forced to litigate many of these issues 
yet again. Parduhn failed to dispute Judge Stirba's and Judge Lubeck's ruling on this issue in the 
first appeal. The law of this case is that any award to JoAnne Buchi and the Buchi children 
should be a non-testamentary transfer and not pass through the estate of Brad Buchi. 
In the present case, Judge Lubeck, following the instructions of the Utah Supreme Court, 
equitably distributed the insurance proceeds on the life of Brad Buchi. He, sitting without a jury, 
listened to all the testimony presented by all the parties to the litigation. He had the opportunity 
to consider all the documents presented by the parties to substantiate their claims. Judge Lubeck 
considered thoroughly and accurately what Brad Buchi's intent was when the partnership 
purchased the life insurance policy. He heard the testimony from all the witnesses, including 
Glade Parduhn, about how they ran the business and managed the partnership. He considered 
the relationship of JoAnne Buchi and her husband and the Buchi children and their father. 
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Certainly, Judge Lubeck was in the best position to judge the demeanor and credibility of all the 
witnesses who testified. Parduhn, personally and as the surviving partner of University Texaco 
Partnership, cannot demonstrate that Judge Lubeck's decision was "clearly erroneous" or against 
the "great weight of the evidence." Parduhn has the burden to demonstrate Judge Lubeck had 
virtually no facts to support his decision. He has not and cannot meet this burden. Parduhn 
cannot show where Judge Lubeck's decision fails to meet the high standard of review that 
applies to this case. 
c. The trial court properly excluded and did not consider JoAnne Buchi's 
expunged record. 
Parduhn claimed he should have been allowed to introduce JoAnne Buchi's conviction in 
1992, even though her record had been expunged and the conviction was years prior. (JoAnne 
Buchi's Addendum Ex. 2). Judge Lubeck granted JoAnne's Motion-in-Limine to exclude the 
conviction at the time of trial. (JoAnne Buchi's Addendum Ex. 3). The conviction has little or 
nothing to do with JoAnne's entitlement or her status as Brad Buchi's wife. Parduhn's efforts 
can only be viewed as an attempt to confuse the issues. 
2. The Trial Court Awarded all the Remaining Assets of University Texaco to 
Parduhn 
Judge Lubeck's May 14, 2003 decision reads, in part, "The court further finds, as a 
matter of equity, that the remaining partnership assets are Parduhn's because the partnership was 
still winding up and not terminated at the time of Buchi's death. Considering the intent of the 
parties, that the insurance proceeds cash out the deceased partner's interest in the partnership 
allowing the surviving partner to do as he wished with the partnership, the court finds that by 
awarding the insurance proceeds to Buchi's heirs, Buchi's interest in the partnership, in effect, 
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was cashed out. Accordingly, the partnership assets are Parduhn's." (Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 
7 ,pg. l l ) . 
The proceeds from the sale of the service stations to Blackett Oil Company, were placed 
in an escrow account with Associated Title Company. The money in the two service stations' 
bank accounts was dissipated after the sale. The only remaining assets of University Texaco was 
the amount held in the escrow account. After Brad Buchi's death on August 7, 1997, Parduhn, in 
his capacity as the sole surviving partner, assumed total control over the escrow account. He 
approved all expenditures from the escrow account. He did not seek approval of Jo Anne Buchi 
or the Buchi children. (Trial Transcript, pg. 57) 
At the time of the trial in August 2001, Parduhn testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. And after he (Brad Buchi) died were any funds distributed out of the Associated 
Title account? 
A. The ones he signed and there was a few little, bitty ones on the lawsuits and what have 
you. 
(Trial Transcript, pg. 56) 
Q. Was there any money left over after the payment of lien holders and mortgages following 
the sale of the partnership? 
A. I think there was about $100,000. 
(Trial Transcript, pg. 35) 
Larry Johnson, University Texaco's long time bookkeeper and accountant, testified at the 
time of the trial that there had been small disbursements for accounting services and the Snap-
On-Tools Corporation claim of $6,250.66 since Brad's death (University Texaco's Addendum 
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Ex. 6 and Trial Transcript pg. 0063)1. Based on the testimony of Parduhn and Johnson at the 
trial, there should be approximately $90,000.00 remaining in the escrow account. Judge Lubeck 
ordered the entire amount remaining in the escrow account be awarded to Parduhn on an 
equitable basis. Therefore, Judge Lubeck did not leave Parduhn empty handed in the equitable 
distribution. 
B. UNIVERSITY TEXACO'S MOTION TO INTERVENE WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
1. The Statute of Limitations for making claims on the insurance policy on Brad 
Buchi's life has run, therefore University Texaco's claim is time barred. 
The Utah Insurance Code, §31A-21-313 Limitations of actions, reads; (1) An action on 
a written policy or contract of first party insurance must be commenced within three years after 
the inception of the loss. 
Statutes of Limitations are applicable even in cases where the parties seek an award based 
on a theory of equity such as we have in the present case. In the Utah Court of Appeals case of 
Nilson-Newey & Company v. Utah Resources International 905 P.2d 312 (Utah 1995), an 
investor in a syndicate brought an action for an accounting and distribution of profits. The trial 
court dismissed the complaint primarily on the bases of laches and the statutes of limitations. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the decision. The court noted that laches is an equitable doctrine 
"based on the maxim that equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. To 
successfully assert laches one must establish that (1) plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing 
an action, and (2) defendants were prejudiced by the delay, (at pg. 314). See also Cig 
1
 Snap-on-Tools brought a claim against Glade Parduhn individually and as the surviving partner of University 
Texaco and University Texaco in 1999 and filed a claim against the estate of Brad Buchi in 1997 for the $6,250.66 
debt. P. Bryan Fishburn represented Glade Parduhn personally and as the surviving partner and University Texaco. 
He negotiated a settlement amount of $2,500.00. The settlement resulted in an Order of Dismissal in the claim 
against Glade Parduhn, personally and as the surviving partner of University Texaco. However, it did not include 
the claim against Brad Buchi's estate. There is no dispute the Snap-on-Tools debt was a debt of the partnership and 
not a personal debt. (JoAnne Buchi's Addendum Ex. 7, 8, 9). 
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Exploration, Inc. v. State of Utah, 2001 P.3d 966 (Utah 2002) where the Utah Supreme Court 
held that equitable claims are barred by statute of limitations. 
Brad Buchi died on approximately August 7, 1997. Any action brought to recoup the 
proceeds on the insurance policy on his life had to be filed by August 7, 2000. University 
Texaco's Motion to Intervene in this action was time barred by the running of the Statute of 
Limitations. On this basis alone, it was legally sound to deny University Texaco's motion. 
2. The trial court properly ruled University Texaco could not intervene. 
University Texaco cites Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 24 (b) Permissive 
Intervention as supporting its Motion to Intervene. Rule 24 (b) does not eliminate or supercede 
the applicable Statute of Limitations. Rule 24 (B) requires the intervenor to file timely. Rule 
24 Intervention, in pertinent part, reads; (b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application 
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and 
the main action have a question of law or fact in common In exercising its discretion the 
court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 
Glade Parduhn filed his claim for the proceeds on the life insurance on Brad Buchi on 
November 7, 1997. He filed his claim personally and individually. He never asserted any claim 
on behalf of University Texaco. Glade Parduhn was the partner charged with the duties and 
responsibilities to wind up the affairs of the partnership after Brad Buchi died. He assumed 
those duties and responsibilities from the date of Brad's death through the present. Obviously, 
he was fully aware of the insurance policy on Brad's life and the ongoing litigation regarding its 
distribution. Present counsel represented both Glade Parduhn personally in this action and 
University Texaco in winding up the partnership affairs. (JoAnne Buchi's Addendum Ex. 7). 
He only withdrew as counsel for University Texaco in March 2003 when he finally realized the 
conflict in his representing both Glade Parduhn personally and as the surviving partner. He, too, 
was fully aware of this litigation, since he filed the claim for Parduhn in 1997. 
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Judge Stirba held two significant scheduling conferences and entered two significant 
scheduling orders in this regard. At the first scheduling conference on July 21, 1999, the judge 
wanted to make sure all real parties in interest were joined and present. At that time, Jo Anne 
Buchi was joined as a party in the litigation. Glade Parduhn did not assert any claim on behalf of 
University Texaco at that time. Glade Parduhn did not move to join University Texaco as a real 
party in interest at that time. At the second scheduling conference on March 24, 2000, Judge 
Stirba set the deadline for Motions to Amend Pleadings or Add Parties by April 7, 2000. Glade 
Parduhn, again, did not move to amend the pleadings to include a claim on behalf of University 
Texaco. He did not move to add University Texaco as a party to the action. 
In Jenner v. Real Estate Services, 659 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that an undisclosed partner of a purchaser under a land sale contract was not entitled to 
intervene after a default judgment had been entered in an action to declare a forfeiture of the 
contract. The reason the court gave for not allowing the undisclosed partner to intervene was 
because he permitted his partner to assume the role of sole owner of their interest under the 
contract and the known purchaser had been duly served with notice of default in the contract 
payments and demand for payment and had been duly served with summons in the forfeiture 
action. The undisclosed partner discovered the default judgment had been entered about two 
days after it occurred. He filed his motion to intervene and set aside the default eleven days 
later. Despite this short period of time, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision 
not to permit the intervention. 
Another pertinent case is Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984). In the Kemp case, 
the Utah Supreme Court discussed Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17. Parties plaintiff 
and defendant, (a) Real party in interest which reads in relevant part, "Every action shall be 
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prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." Kemp, who was a partner in a joint venture, 
brought suit against potential investors for interference with prospective economic advantage and 
breach of agreement. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of Kemp's 
complaint because the partner was required to either name the partnership as a party in interest or 
join his partner as an indispensable party in interest. 
In the present case, the reasons not to permit intervention by University Texaco are even 
more compelling than in the cases cited above. Here, the surviving partner who had the duty to 
protect any alleged asset and to pursue any alleged claim, failed to do so. It is apparent, Glade 
Parduhn made a calculated decision not to include University Texaco as a party in this case. He 
failed to include University Texaco so he could pursue the claim exclusively for his personal 
benefit. When that strategy failed, he hired a separate attorney to represent University Texaco. 
As the surviving partner, he then attempted to intervene on behalf of University Texaco. His 
decisions as the surviving partner should not excuse his failure to file a claim on behalf of 
University Texaco at the inception of this litigation. 
To allow University Texaco to intervene this late would prejudiced Jo Anne Buchi and the 
Buchi children enormously. The delay in distribution of the proceeds of the life insurance policy 
on Brad's life already has prevented them from getting on with their lives and does not allow 
closure. To redo and re-litigate many of the issues already resolved would cause painful delay 
and cost all the parties significant amounts. It is unfair and unjust especially in light of the fact 
Glade Parduhn, the surviving partner, could have and should have brought any claim on behalf 
of University Texaco long ago. Judge Lubeck rightfully denied University Texaco's Motion to 
Intervene and did not abuse his discretion. Importantly, Judge Lubeck held he could have made 
an award to University Texaco in equity even without University Texaco's intervention. 
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University Texaco cannot claim any prejudice as a result of Judge Lubeck's position. His ruling 
should stand. 
C. THE PROCEEDS OF THE LIFE INSURANCE POLICY ON BRAD BUCHI'S 
LIFE ARE NOT AN ASSET OF THE PARTNERSHIP OF UNIVERSITY 
TEXACO 
Based on a reference in Footnote 3 of the Utah Supreme Court decision of September 6, 
2002, Parduhn claims that if he is not entitled to the proceeds of the life insurance policy on Brad 
Buchi's life, the proceeds should be considered an asset of the partnership of University Texaco. 
It was not until March 4, 2003 that Parduhn first asserted the position, that if he is not entitled to 
the proceeds personally, the proceeds should go to the partnership. It goes without saying that he 
was fully aware of the University Texaco's potential claim and he made a calculated decision not 
to name University Texaco as a party. Any claim on the part of the partnership, especially in 
light of Parduhn's duties and responsibilities as the surviving partner, should be considered 
waived and the partnership should be estopped from raising them at this late stage. 
Contrary to Parduhn's position, Footnote 3 of the Utah Supreme Court decision did not 
mandate that the proceeds of the life insurance policy on Brad Buchi's life be considered assets 
of the partnership. Footnote 3 states, in part, "It is conceivable that the insurance policy and its 
proceeds belonged to the partnership entity. Property acquired with partnership funds are 
presumed to be assets of the partnership, including insurance on the life of a partner. See 59A 
Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §358, 362 (1987); see also Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Insurance on 
Life of Partner as Partnership Asset, 56 A.L.R. 3d 892, 896-907 (2001) (making note of cases 
where payment of premiums was relevant or determinative in deciding insurance was partnership 
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asset). However, this presumption may be rebutted with evidence of a contrary intention 
by the parties. See 59A Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §359 (1987)." 
Utah adopted the Uniform Partnership Act, Utah Code Ann. §48-1-1 et. seq. which 
defines partnership property in §48-1-5 in part, as follows, "Unless the contrary intention 
appears, property acquired with partnership funds is partnership property." 59A Am. Jur. 2d 
Partnership §359 (1987), referred to by the Utah Supreme Court in its opinion, reads, in part, "In 
view of the Uniform Partnership Act's provision that property acquired with partnership funds is 
partnership property, 'unless the contrary intention appears,' the presumption from the use of 
partnership funds for the purchase of property, while strong evidence that the property belongs to 
the partnership, is not conclusive, and is rebuttable. The rule serves to protect the actualities 
of ownership and does not apply to situations where the parties intend otherwise." 59A 
Am. Jur. 2d Partnership §361 (1987) states, "The presumption that property purchased with 
partnership funds is partnership property is a rebuttable presumption, but when it is shown that 
property is purchased with partnership funds, the burden of proving that it is not partnership 
property is on the person so alleging. Once rebutted, the presumption dissipates and has no 
further evidentiary weight." 
The Utah Supreme Court also referred to 56 A.L.R. 3d 892 (2001) in Footnote 3 of its 
opinion. §892, §§4 notes, "The fact that funds of a partnership are used to purchase a policy on 
the life of a partner may raise the presumption that the policy is an asset of the firm. This 
presumption may, however, be contradicted by evidence showing a contrary intention on 
the part of the partners, such as regular practice of using partnership funds for personal 
obligations." 
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Judge Lubeck, in his Memorandum Decision of May 14, 2003, stated, "The court finds 
that the policy was not intended to be a partnership asset. Here the business was sold to Blackett 
Oil. No one seemingly thinks that the policies thus belong to Blackett Oil. That a factor alone 
seems to indicate the policies did not belong to the partnership and were not considered a 
partnership asset." 
"Considering all of the facts, the court does not believe it needs to have a further 
evidentiary hearing as plaintiff at once suggested and as University Texaco suggested. This 
court believes that it can decide the equities based on what is before it. This court does not 
consider materials provided in the pleadings in the form of depositions but only considers the 
evidence from the trial. The Supreme Court did not direct that further evidence be taken in this 
matter. This court heard the trial and received considered exhibits from events in 1979, 1984 and 
1989 and later. The court believes that is the best evidence as to the intent and conduct of the 
parties, rather than now entertaining someone's opinion and rather than now hearing facts 
tailored to the issue before the court. The parties had opportunity to present whatever evidence 
they deemed proper and the court heard such evidence. Although the premiums for both 
Parduhn and Buchi's policies were paid by the partnership that is not the only, nor even the most 
important, factor. The designation of the partner as the beneficiary rather than the partnership 
indicate Parduhn and Buchi intended that their policies were their personal assets." 
"Further, the partners treated the partnership rather casually, basically taking what they 
needed in many instances." 
-35-
"Parduhn and Buchi were principally in charge of one of the two gas stations and they ran 
the station basically on their own without much intervention from the other. There was evidence 
at trial that partnership proceeds were used to pay for various things that were not considered 
partnership assets. There was regular use of partnership funds for personal use and the 
accounting was somewhat relaxed. The conduct of the partners shows that the intent was not to 
provide the partnership as an entity with any assets from the insurance policies." 
"The Supreme Court's opinion is not being ignored or disobeyed in this discussion. This 
court realizes full well its responsibility to follow the direction of the Supreme Court and that is 
what this court is attempting to do. The Supreme Court said in footnote 3 that it is "conceivable" 
that the policy and its proceeds could be a partnership asset because the policies were paid with 
partnership funds. The Court also stated that presumption could be rebutted with evidence of a 
contrary intention. The court believes there is already in this case strong evidence that rebuts 
that presumption." 
(Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 7 pgs. 9-11, Record 1902-1904) 
Despite the fact University Texaco paid the premiums on the life insurance policies on 
both partners' lives, the partners regularly intermingled personal and partnership assets and 
debts. The course of doing business by both partners proves the partners never intended the life 
insurance policies on their lives to be considered partnership assets. This is further demonstrated 
in the partnership agreement with the buy-sell provision, the applications and actual life 
insurance policies. None of these important documents listed the University Texaco as the 
beneficiary or owner or the life insurance policies as assets of the business. The life insurance 
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policies were not turned over to Blackett Oil when the business was sold. The fact Parduhn 
never raised or ever considered bringing this claim until now, definitively proves the partners 
never intended the proceeds to be partnership assets. 
The evidence in the present case strongly and convincingly rebuts any presumption the 
life insurance policy proceeds were intended to be partnership assets. Even though the Utah 
Supreme Court found it was null and void as of the date of the sale of the business to Blackett 
Oil, the partnership agreement with the buy-sell provision demonstrated the intent of Glade 
Parduhn and Brad Buchi. The agreement stated the life insurance policies were purchased to 
fund the buy-sell agreement. In the event one of the partners died, the proceeds of the life 
insurance policy were to pass through the surviving partner to the wife and survivors of the dead 
partner. The partnership agreement did not state the life insurance policies belonged to the 
partnership, but rather were for the exclusive purpose of buying out the deceased partner's 
family's interest in the business. The applications for the life insurance policies and the policies 
themselves specified the purpose for the policies was to fund the buy-sell agreement. The 
policies did not list the partnership as the beneficiary, though the partners certainly had that 
option. Clearly, it was not Brad Buchi's or Glade Parduhn's intent for the policies to be assets of 
the business. 
Judge Lubeck found the partners' business practices and management was fairly informal 
and loose. Each partner had their own checking account for the station they were personally 
running. They did not regularly consult a lawyer and drafted their own amendments to their 
Partnership Agreement. Their agreement stated that the wife and survivors were to get the 
proceeds of the life insurance - not the partnership. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in this case, acknowledged the presumption could be rebutted 
if the evidence demonstrated the parties did not intend the life insurance to be an asset of the 
partnership. All reliable evidence proves the life insurance policy on Brad Buchi's life was 
never intended to be an asset of the partnership. The trial court properly ruled that the proceeds 
of the life insurance on Brad Buchi's life are not partnership assets. Since the life insurance 
proceeds are not partnership assets, the trial court properly ordered the proceeds belonged to the 
survivors of Brad Buchi. 
When he is speaking for himself, Glade Parduhn asserts he is entitled to the proceeds 
from the life insurance on the basis he is the named beneficiary. When he is speaking as the 
surviving partner winding up the partnership affairs, he claims the life insurance proceeds are an 
asset of the partnership. The reason for the double speak is obvious. If he can't get all the 
proceeds directly as the named beneficiary, he will attempt to get the proceeds by making claims 
of entitlement in the final accounting of the partnership or making claims against the estate of 
Brad Buchi. This court should reject Parduhn's never ceasing efforts to deny this family the life 
insurance proceeds Brad Buchi intended them to get. 
D. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT REJECTED PARDUHN'S CLAIM THAT 
DEFENDANTS WAIVED ANY DEFENSE BASED ON UTAH CODE ANN. 
S31A-21-104 
Parduhn continues to assert his argument that the Buchis waived their argument 
predicated on §31A-21-105 by failing to timely plead it as an affirmative defense. Parduhn 
asserted this argument before the trial court at least twice before the trial in August 2001. The 
trial court rejected it. Parduhn raised it in his first Appeal and, then again in his Motion for 
Rehearing, before the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court rejected it. Parduhn 
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admitted in his memorandum on remand to the trial court, he knows full well the Utah Supreme 
Court rejected his argument. Yet he raised it again before the trial court on remand and now 
again in his second appeal. The Utah Supreme Court has decided the law of this case. The 
Buchis are entitled to and rightly asserted Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104. The Buchis should not 
be obligated to argue this issue yet once again. However, out of an abundance of caution, 
JoAnne Buchi includes argument on this point hereinbelow. 
E. NEITHER GLADE PARDUHN NOR THE PARTNERSHIP OF UNIVERSITY 
TEXACO HAD AN INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE LIFE OF BRAD BUCHI 
1. As of the time of Brad Buchi's death, neither Glade Parduhn or the 
partnership of University Texaco had an insurable interest in Brad Buchi's 
life since the insurance contract was no longer an "integral part of a 
legitimate buy-sell agreement" pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104. 
In the September 6, 2002 decision, the Utah Supreme Court held the partnership between 
Brad Buchi and Glade Parduhn was dissolved as of July 14, 1997 when the gas stations were 
sold to Blackett Oil Company. As a result of the dissolution of the partnership, the partnership 
agreement with the buy-sell provision was null and void. As the Supreme Court unequivocally 
held Glade Parduhn had no insurable interest in the life of Brad Buchi when Brad died on August 
7, 1997, approximately three weeks after the partnership was dissolved. Based on the same 
analysis of the law and facts, the partnership of University Texaco also lacked an insurable 
interest in Brad Buchi's life at the time of his death as well. 
The Utah Supreme Court decision held "§31A-21-104 (2) (a) specifically limits partners' 
insurable interests, required by §31A-21-104 (1) (b) for obtaining insurance generally, to those 
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that are "for purposes of insurance contracts that are an integral part of a legitimate buy-sell 
agreement." Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 (2) (a) (1999). Because the buy-sell agreement was 
terminated, Parduhn had no insurable interest which was "for purposes of [an] insurance contract 
[ ] that [was] an integral part of a legitimate buy-sell agreement." IcL Thus, at the time of 
Buchi's death, Parduhn lacked an insurable interest under §31A-21-104 (1) (b), and "may not 
knowingly procure . . . an interest in the proceeds of [the] insurance policy." Id. §31A-21-104 
(1) (b)." (Parduhn's Addendum Ex. 6, pgs. 5-6). 
Contrary to the position espoused by Parduhn and University Texaco, neither Parduhn 
nor University Texaco had an insurable interest in the life of Brad Buchi as of the time of his 
death. Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 defines insurable interest in clear terms. "Insurable 
interest in a person means, for persons closely related by blood or by law, a substantial interest 
engendered by love and affection, or in the case of other persons, a lawful and substantial interest 
in having the life, health, bodily safety of the person insured continues." Most importantly, the 
statute defines when a partner has an insurable interest in the life of a partner. "A shareholder 
or partner has an insurable interest in the life of other shareholders or partners for the 
purposes of insurance contracts that are an integral part of a legitimate buy-sell agreement 
respecting shares or a partnership interest in the business." 
The Utah Insurance Code in §31 A-1-301 states "person" includes an individual, 
partnership, corporation, incorporated or unincorporated association, joint stock company, trust, 
reciprocal syndicate, or any similar entity or combination of entities acting in concert. By logical 
extension, Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 applies to the partnership of University Texaco as well 
as to Glade Parduhn, individually and personally. Therefore, it is ludicrous (and potentially a 
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conflict of interest) for Glade Parduhn to assert that the partnership of University Texaco has an 
insurable interest when the Utah Supreme Court ruled he had no insurable interest. 
A partner or a partnership does not have an insurable interest after the partnership is 
dissolved or terminated. In Keeton & Widdis, Insurance Law, §3.5 (c) Relationships Supporting 
an Insurable Interest in Another's Life, (3) Non Family Relationships, on this point. It states, 
"When a beneficiary is not a relative and does not appear to suffer any quantifiable pecuniary 
loss as a result of an individual's death, the claims of beneficiaries have on occasion presented 
some rather difficult dilemmas for courts. When there is no reasonable expectation of 
pecuniary benefits from the continued life of an insured or when the amount of the life 
insurance is grossly disproportionate to the beneficiary's pecuniary relationship to an 
insured, the requisite insurable interest has been held not to exit." (Pg. 184) The Comment 
to this section of the treatise reads, "The arguments for applying an expectation theory to life 
insurance in business situations are considerably less compelling than the substantial 
justification which exists for the factual expectancy theory of insurable interest as applied 
to property insurance. Courts should be at least somewhat reluctant to recognize highly 
speculative interests incident to business relationships, and especially in regard to former 
business associations, as sufficient insurable interests for life insurance." (pg. 184) 
As the Utah Supreme Court of Utah determined, Glade Parduhn and Brad Buchi's 
partnership had dissolved. The partnership of University Texaco no longer existed. Parduhn and 
Buchi had no plans for any future business ventures together. Parduhn and the partnership of 
University Texaco had no reasonable expectation to any future pecuniary benefits deriving from 
the continued life of Brad Buchi. Neither Parduhn nor University Texaco had an insurable 
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interest in Brad Buchi's life. Therefore neither Parduhn nor the partnership can claim any of the 
proceeds from the life insurance on Brad's life. 
2. Brad Buchi only gave his consent to name Glade Parduhn as the beneficiary 
on the insurance policy on his life as an integral part of the buy-sell 
agreement With the dissolution of the partnership, Brad Buchi's consent to 
name Glade Parduhn as the beneficiary was no longer valid. Brad Buchi 
never gave his consent to name University Texaco as the beneficiary, 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 (3) states "an insurer may not knowingly issue an 
individual life or accident or health insurance policy to a person other than the one whose life or 
health is at risk unless that person [ ] has given written consent to the issuance of the policy. The 
person shall express consent either by signing an application for the insurance with knowledge of 
the nature of the document, or in any other reasonable way." 
Brad Buchi agreed to obtain insurance on his own life with Glade Parduhn named as the 
beneficiary as an integral part of their buy-sell agreement. Buchi's consent to name Parduhn as 
the beneficiary was for this exclusive purpose of the partnership agreement with the buy-sell 
provision entered on May 23, 1979. Brad Buchi consented to increase the amount of the 
insurance for the buy-sell agreement as evidenced by the written amendment of January 25, 
1984. He consented to increase the insurance for the buy-sell agreement on January 4, 1989 as 
evidenced by his signature on the application. The application states the purpose of the 
insurance policy is for the buy-sell agreement. Sheldon Hansen testified it was his understanding 
the purpose of the insurance was to fund the buy-sell agreement. (Trial Transcript, pg. 133, pg. 
134). 
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At no time and in none of the pertinent documents did Brad Buchi ever give his consent 
to name University Texaco as the beneficiary of the life insurance policy even though he could 
have. Certainly, had it been his or Glade's intent to have the proceeds of the life insurance 
policy pass to University Texaco, they could have named the partnership as the beneficiary. 
They did not. 
The Utah Supreme Court held the partnership dissolved as of July 14, 1997 when the 
service stations were sold to Blackett Oil Company. The buy-sell agreement was rendered null 
and void when the partnership was dissolved. The underlying basis for Brad Buchi's consent to 
name Glade Parduhn as the beneficiary was gone. There was no reason for him to have named 
either Glade Parduhn or University Texaco once the partnership was dissolved. In the absence of 
the buy-sell agreement, Buchi could not have named Parduhn as the beneficiary on the insurance 
policy on his life. He could not have named University Texaco at that point either. More 
importantly, all the credible evidence introduced at trial indicates Buchi would not have 
benefited Parduhn or a defunct partnership to the huge detriment of his wife and children. Since 
the underlying premise to Buchi's consent, namely; the buy-sell agreement was null and void; 
Buchi 5s consent was also null and void. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104 (3) specifically addresses such situations. "Any insurance 
provided in violation of this subsection is subject to Subsection (5)." Subsection (5) states, "An 
insurance policy is not invalid because the policyholder lacks insurable interest or because 
consent has not been given, but a court with appropriate jurisdiction may order the proceeds to 
be paid to some person who is equitably entitled to them, other than the one to whom the policy 
is designated to be payable, or it may create a constructive trust in the proceeds or a part of them 
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on behalf of such a person, subject to all the valid terms and conditions of the policy other than 
those relating to insurable interest or consent." 
The trial court's determination that equity mandated the insurance proceeds be distributed 
to the Buchi family and the remaining business assets to Parduhn is consistent with the intent of 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-104(5). 
XL CONCLUSION 
The time has come for this matter to be resolved once and for all. Brad Buchi died in 
August 1997. It has been nearly six and one-half years since his death. When Brad Buchi and 
Glade Parduhn purchased the life insurance policies on each of their lives, they both intended the 
proceeds of those life insurance policies to go to their wives and survivors. Since Brad's death, 
JoAnne Buchi has had to deal with grief and loss. She has had to handle much of Brad's 
unfinished affairs. Since Brad's death, his children are growing up. Several of them have 
married and are starting families. Several of them are attempting to go to college. Lance Buchi 
was a victim of a devastating accident that nearly took his life. He still suffers from the horrific 
injuries he sustained. There is no evidence Brad would have wanted or intended for Parduhn or 
University Texaco to get a $300,000.00 windfall after the partnership was dissolved and the 
business was sold. There is no doubt, Brad's relationship with Parduhn was over as soon as the 
winding up of the partnership was concluded. There is no doubt, Brad's relationship with 
University Texaco was over. However, that was not the case with his relationship with JoAnne 
and his children. JoAnne and Brad were making plans to resume living together and for their 
future. Brad's children were entering critical periods of their lives as they emerged from 
childhood into young adulthood. Brad certainly would have been a significant part of their lives. 
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Brad wanted to provide for his family. That was the reason he got the insurance. There is no 
credible evidence either Brad or Glade ever intended for the proceeds to go to their partner. 
They never intended for the proceeds to become an asset of the partnership. They wanted the 
insurance to protect their own wives and children. 
The trial court's decision on remand is fair, just and equitable. It is fair, just and 
equitable for the Buchi family to receive the life insurance policy proceeds on Brad's life and for 
Glade Parduhn to receive the remaining assets of University Texaco. JoAnne Buchi respectfully 
requests the Utah Supreme Court to uphold the decision of the trial court in this matter. 
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